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Ukrainian economy on the verge of recession
Arkadiusz Sarna
In the third quarter of 2012, Ukraine’s economy recorded negative growth (-1.3%) for the first 
time since its 2009 economic crisis. Q4 GDP is projected to suffer a further decline, bringing 
Ukraine into formal recession. In addition to the worsening macroeconomic indicators, Ukra-
ine is also facing a series of concomitant economic problems: a growing trade deficit, indu-
strial decline, shrinking foreign exchange reserves, and the weakening of the hryvnia. Poor 
economic growth is expected to result in lower than projected budget revenues, which in turn 
could lead to the sequestration of the budget in December. The decline evident across the key 
economic indicators in the second half of 2012 brings to a close a period of relative economic 
stability and two years of economic growth, which had been seen as a significant personal 
achievement of President Viktor Yanukovych and the ruling Party of Regions. 
The health of the Ukrainian economy largely depends on the state of the country’s export- 
-oriented industries. The current economic forecasts for foreign markets are not very optimi-
stic. It is impossible to determine whether the current economic downturn is likely to be merely 
temporary or whether it heralds the onset of a prolonged economic crisis. The limited capacity 
to deal with the growing economic problems may mean that Kiev will need to seek financial 
support from abroad. This is particularly significant with regard to external debt servicing, 
since in 2013 Ukraine will need to pay back around 9 billion USD, including over 5.5 billion USD 
to the International Monetary Fund. In order to overcome the recession and stabilise public 
finances, the government may be forced to take a series of unpopular measures, including ra-
ising the price of natural gas and utilities. These measures have been stipulated by the IMF as 
a condition of further financial assistance and the disbursement of the 12 billion USD stabilisa-
tion loan granted to Ukraine in July 2010. The only alternative for Western loans and economic 
reforms appears to be financial support from Russia. The price for Moscow’s help might howe-
ver turn out to be very high, and precipitate a turn in Kiev’s foreign policy towards a gradual 
re-integration of former Soviet republics under Moscow-led geopolitical projects.  
Fading growth and other signs 
of a slowing economy 
Despite negative GDP figures for the third quar-
ter, the results for the first and second quar-
ters (showing 2% and 3% growth, respectively) 
might still allow Ukraine to achieve real econom-
ic growth for 2012. Since the GDP figures for the 
fourth quarter are expected to decline further, 
most independent economists in Ukraine and in-
ternational financial institutions forecast Ukraine’s 
annual growth to reach between 0.5–1.9%1. 
Whatever the final figures for the fourth quarter, 
1 В. Пасочник, Украинская экономика: поствыборные 
вердикты, Зеркало недели. Украина, 2.11.2012 (http:// 
zn.ua/ECONOMICS/ukrainskaya_ekonomika_postvybor- 
nye_verdikty-111522.html); Аналитики не исключают 
рецессии в Украине уже в этом году, 5.11.2012 (http://
korrespondent.net/business/economics/1418958-analiti-
ki-ne-isklyuchayut-recessii-v-ukraine-uzhe-v-etom-godu).
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2012 is bound to produce the worst macroeco-
nomic results since 2009, when the deepest eco-
nomic downturn in the history of independent 
Ukraine was recorded, with GDP dropping by 
nearly 15%. (see Appendix 1).
A fall in GDP in the third quarter had been pres-
aged by the negative macroeconomic indicators 
published earlier in the year. Among the first 
symptoms of the worsening economic situation 
was a drop in industrial production in March 
(-1.1%) – the first such decline since October 
2009. In the following two months, production 
picked up slightly, only to fall back again in June 
(-1.4%). This trend continued for the next four 
months (-0.9% in July; -4.7% in August; -7% in 
September; -4.2% in October). Consequently, 
overall industrial production for the first three 
quarters of 2012 fell by 1.2% compared to the 
same period in 2011. Meanwhile, the value of 
agricultural production for the correspond-
ing period dipped by 4.4%, and the Ukrainian 
construction industry suffered a 9.1% slump 
(see Appendix 2).
Poor economic growth has led to lower than 
projected budget revenues and a rising budget 
deficit, which by September 2012 had exceeded 
24 billion hryvnia (3 billion USD). For Septem-
ber alone, the budget deficit came to 7.4 billion 
hryvnia. This raises concerns about the possible 
sequestration of the budget in December. This 
year, Ukraine’s Parliament has already approved 
a series of increases – in the planned level of 
the budget deficit, which by the end of the year 
is expected to reach around 2.5–2.6% of GDP 
(up from 1.8% in 2011).
The reasons for the current downturn
There are a number of reasons for the poor 
macroeconomic performance currently evident 
in Ukraine. First of all, the Ukrainian economy 
heavily depends on foreign export markets 
(around 60% of Ukraine’s GDP is produced by 
export-oriented sectors), which have them-
selves been experiencing a downturn. A fall in 
global steel prices (see Appendix 3) has contrib-
uted to a sharp decline in the value of Ukrainian 
steel exports in the nine months to September, 
which has been estimated at 12% or 2 billion 
USD. Since as much as 70–80% of Ukraine’s 
steel production is earmarked for export, 
the decline in international sales translated into 
a 4.5% reduction in the output of the steel 
industry in the first three quarters of 2012. 
Weaker results are also apparent in Ukraine’s 
agricultural sector. After last year’s record 
grain harvest of 56.7 million tonnes, this year’s 
harvest is expected to be around 20% lower2. 
A slowdown in the construction industry, which 
began during the first six months of 2012, sig-
nificantly accelerated following the end of Euro 
2012; however, the majority of construction 
projects associated with the tournament had 
been completed before 2012. 
Similarly, a decline in the exports of Ukraine’s 
metallurgical industry contributed to a fur-
ther increase in the country’s trade deficit. 
In the first three quarters of 2012, Ukraine’s 
trade deficit reached 11.5 billion USD and was 
2.1 billion USD higher than in the same peri-
od in 2011. The main structural problem which 
has led to the current deficit is Ukraine’s de-
pendence on natural gas imports from Russia, 
and in particular, Kiev’s 2009 gas contract with 
Gazprom. The cost of importing Russian gas in 
the nine months to September 2012 exceeded 
10.4 billion USD. Despite a roughly 30%3 drop 
2 However, thanks to large grain stocks created last year 
and rising food prices around the world, the overall val-
ue of Ukraine’s agricultural exports has increased. 
3 Бойко: імпорт газу в Україну через три роки буде 
не більше 5–7 млрд. куб. М (http://www.unian.ua/
news/536159-boyko-import-gazu-v-ukrajinu-cherez-tri-
roki-bude-ne-bilshe-5-7-mlrd-kub-m.html).
Whatever the final macroeconomic fig-
ures, 2012 is set to produce the worst 
results since the 2009 economic crisis 
(the most serious economic crisis in the 
history of independent Ukraine).
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in the amount of gas imported to Ukraine, Kiev 
has already spent more than it did in the cor-
responding period of 2011 (10.3 billion USD). 
This is due to the high price of Russian gas im-
ported by Ukraine, which over the past two 
years has almost doubled. In 2011, Ukraine 
spent over 14 billion USD on gas imports, which 
accounted for as much as 17% of the country’s 
total imports for the year (Ukraine’s gas bill for 
2010 reached 9.4 billion USD, while in 2009 
Ukraine spent 8 billion USD on gas). In order 
to keep prices low, the state heavily subsidises 
gas for individual consumers and the munici-
pal sector, this policy, however, puts additional 
pressure on state finances and drives up both 
national and external debt. The government 
has in recent years regularly provided addition-
al funding for Ukraine’s energy giant Naftogaz 
by issuing it with state bonds which the com-
pany then sells to mostly state-owned banks. 
The funds are then used to pay Gazprom for its 
gas. In 2012 alone, in order to cover the deficit 
in Naftogaz’s budget, the state handed over to 
the company more than 1 billion USD4. In ad-
dition, this year Naftogaz has secured several 
loans from both Ukrainian and Russian state-
owned banks (incl. a 2 billion USD loan from 
Gazprombank, obtained in March 2012, which 
is to be repaid by 2019)5.
In addition to objective external and domestic 
factors, Ukraine’s economic situation is also 
adversely affected by the government’s eco-
nomic policy. During 2010, and in early 2011, 
the cabinet launched a number of significant 
reforms, but soon after, the reforms ground to 
a halt. For instance, following the adoption of 
the 2010 law on the functioning of the gas mar-
ket and the introduction of the first of a series 
of planned gas hikes, the policymakers failed 
4 See: «Нафтогаз» отримав 8,5 млрд грн з держбюдже-
ту-2012 на покриття дефіциту (http://www.rbc.ua/ukr/
top/show/-naftogaz-poluchil-8-5-mlrd-grn-iz-gosby-
udzheta-2012-na-pokrytie-19102012180800). 
5 «Нафтогаз» залучив у держбанку кредит на 2,5 млрд 
грн, 24 липня 2012 (http://news.dt.ua/ECONOMICS/naf-
togaz_zaluchiv_u_derzhbanku_kredit_na_2,5_mlrd_
grn-105829.html).
to keep up the momentum and take further 
steps towards a full reform of the Ukrainian gas 
sector. A new Tax Code, rushed through Parlia-
ment in 2010, limited the number of national 
and local taxes and introduced a gradual re-
duction in the rate of corporate income tax and 
VAT; its provisions, however, needed to be sub-
sequently amended on several occasions due to 
gaps in provisions on the taxation of small and 
medium-sized enterprises. Following the adop-
tion of the law on land cadastre (in 2011), the 
planned agricultural and land market reforms 
also ground to a halt. 
Contrary to the purported liberalization of the 
economy, Ukraine’s economic policy has led 
to a deterioration in the domestic business 
climate. One of the main reasons for this was 
an effective increase in taxation , treated by the 
Ukrainian government as a remedy for the de-
cline in revenue during the economic downturn. 
The government, for example, sharply stepped 
up its collection of corporate income tax pre-
payments from employers and attempted to 
delay the return of overpaid VAT to businesses. 
According to the European Business Associa-
tion (EBA)6, in 2011 Ukraine’s tax burden rose to 
the highest level in the country’s history (with 
taxes accounting for 25% of GDP) and contin-
ues to grow (expected to reach 26% in 2013)7. 
6 The largest organisation of foreign investors in Ukraine, 
bringing together nearly 900 foreign and domestic com-
panies operating in the country.  
7 Ukraine’s tax bodies commonly force businesses await-
ing the return of overpaid VAT to pay 50–70% of that 
amount back to the Treasury in the form of corporate 
income tax prepayments or by purchasing government 
bonds.
Ukraine’s recession has been caused by 
poor economic performance in foreign 
markets: plummeting steel prices are 
having a knock-on effect on Ukraine’s 
export-oriented metallurgy industry; the 
high price of imported gas further deep-
ens Ukraine’s trade deficit.
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Ukraine’s growing dependence on fiscal policy 
was accompanied by the populist pre-election 
policy of increasing social spending.
Between 2008 and 2011, Ukraine also witnessed 
a 70% increase in the level of corruption, meas-
ured in terms of business spending on bribes in 
relationship to their total revenue8. In addition, 
the government’s privatisation agenda, which 
is currently being implemented, has had a neg-
ative impact on the investment climate and the 
possibility of increasing the inflow of foreign 
direct investment. Contrary to the stated pol-
icy of openness to foreign investment, sales of 
state assets in the electricity and gas sectors (re-
gional gas distribution companies) were biased 
in favour of Ukraine’s ‘big business’, with close 
links to President Viktor Yanukovych’s political 
allies9. It should also be noted that apart from 
clearly damaging the investment climate in the 
country, this approach to privatisation has only 
resulted in limited profits for the state budget.
Problems with foreign debt servicing 
and a weak hryvnia
The servicing of Ukraine’s foreign debt is prov-
ing to be a growing challenge for the govern-
ment in Kiev. The size of the public debt (direct 
and guaranteed) still remains at a relatively safe 
level of about 37% of GDP10, reaching about 
62 billion USD at the end of September 2012. 
The problem, however, lies in the debt structure 
and the high proportion of short-term liabili-
ties with maturities within the next year or so. 
8 According to the EBA, businesses operating in Ukraine 
are forced to spend up to 10% of their revenue on 
bribes. 
9 A. Sarna, ‘Dmytro Firtash’s companies are monopolis-
ing the retail gas market in Ukraine’, 24/10/2012 (http://
www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/eastweek/2012-10-24/
dmytro-firtash-s-companies-are-monopolising-re -
tail-gas-market-ukraine) and Запах енерго. Ахметов 
і Фірташ стають головними покупцями великої 
власності в Україні, Korrespondient, 2/12/2011 (http://
kreston-gcg.com/ua/press/publications/energo.html).
10 In the absence of official data, estimates suggest that by 
the end of September 2012, Ukraine’s public debt had 
reached around 37–38% of GDP. This was a result of the 
recent debt growth dynamics and Ukraine’s economic 
growth.
Ukraine had previously experienced problems 
with servicing its foreign debt earlier in 2012, 
and dealt with the issue through partial restruc-
turing11. In 2012, Kiev also suggested it would 
like to restructure the IMF loan  given to Yulia 
Tymoshenko’s government. Despite problems in 
negotiating new terms, in mid-November 2012 
Ukraine paid off the remainder of this year’s 
repayments, estimated at 3.5 billion USD12. 
These repayments, however, coupled with an 
economic slowdown, drained Ukraine’s foreign 
exchange reserves, which fell from 31.8 billion 
USD to 26.8 billion USD between January and 
the end of October (a particularly sharp drop 
– 8.4% – was recorded in October, coincid-
ing with Ukraine’s parliamentary elections)13. 
Foreign exchange reserves have come danger-
ously close to reaching a critical level, equiva-
lent to just three months of import spending. 
Meanwhile, in 2013, Ukraine will have to re-
pay its foreign creditors an estimated 9 billion 
USD14 (of which over 5.5 billion USD constitute 
IMF repayments; see Appendix 4).
A significant drop in currency reserves and 
a growing trade deficit, together with constant 
expenditure on Russian gas, have sparked fears 
11 For example, by repaying a short-term loan obtained 
from Russia’s state-owned Vneshtorgbank. 
12 НБУ: Україна повністю розрахувалася з МВФ за по-
точний рік http://www.unian.ua/news/535899-nbu-
ukrajina-povnistyu-rozrahuvalasya-z-mvf-za-potochniy-
rik.html
13 According to the Ukrainian investment bank Dragon 
Capital, in October, just 20% (about $400 million) of 
the central bank currency reserves were spent servicing 
Ukraine’s debt (IMF loan), while most was used to bol-
ster the hryvnia’s exchange rate.
14 See, for example: Госдолг Украины: что год грядущий 
нам готовит… (http://kontrakty.ua/article/55026).
The servicing of Ukraine’s foreign debt has 
become a serious challenge. Already this 
year Ukraine has resorted to restructuring 
its debt; this will, however, significantly in-
crease next year’s repayments.
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of a potentially significant depreciation of the 
hryvnia. In mid-November, these factors, com-
bined with the increased demand for foreign 
currencies traditionally experienced around 
election time, resulted in a decrease in the 
market value of Ukraine’s national currency 
from about 8.1 to 8.3 against the US dollar; 
the lowest since 2009. It is possible, however, 
that the hryvnia will sink further, trading later 
in the year at 8.4–8.5 to the US dollar, and even 
reaching 9 UAH/USD in the future. 
Outlook for 2013
Due to the recent parliamentary elections, 
the Ukrainian government had for some time de-
liberately delayed a decision to lower this year’s 
projected GDP growth from the unrealistic rate 
of 3.9% set out in the 2012 budget. A few days 
before the ballot, the Prime Minister assured 
the Ukrainian people that the economy was do-
ing well and the situation was stable. It was not 
until 7 November that Prime Minister Mykola 
Azarov admitted during a Cabinet meeting that 
the economic crisis was continuing to deepen, 
adding that the major cause of the downturn 
in Ukraine was a current slowdown in global 
markets, including a fall in the price of steel 
products and higher prices of imported gas. 
So far, however, the government has not 
changed its macroeconomic policies for this 
year or the next: the draft 2013 budget sets it-
self a GDP growth target of 4.5%. To meet such 
an optimistic target, Ukraine would (in addition 
to other conditions) need the so-called low 
 
base effect – i.e. GDP growth in 2012 negative 
or close to zero. Although experts and financial 
institutions have so far been predicting some 
degree of economic recovery for 2013, the di-
vergence of opinion as to next year’s growth 
of Ukrainian GDP is still high (from 0.5% pro-
jected by Fitch to 3.8% forecast by Ernst & 
Young). Since the condition of the Ukrainian 
economy is highly dependent on the condition 
of export-oriented sectors – and the outlook for 
foreign markets remains highly unpredictable15 
– forecasts for next year are subject to a consid-
erable margin of error. Thus, the current eco-
nomic downturn may be either merely tempo-
rary, or it may transition into a prolonged crisis.
Possible future measures 
and their political effect
To ensure the stabilization of the economic sit-
uation, the government may need to resort to 
controversial and unpopular measures. In the 
short term, it can ‘exchange’ some of the for-
eign debt. This could be done by repaying some 
of the debt using funds generated through the 
issue of domestic bonds. The bonds would then 
be purchased by either state-owned banks or 
Ukraine’s central bank. This option is however 
limited due to low levels of foreign currency re-
serves. On November 6, the previous Parliament 
approved a bill submitted by the National Bank 
of Ukraine, which gives the NBU powers to or-
der companies operating in the country to sell 
part of their currency revenues obtained from 
exports to the state. These measures can be in-
troduced for up to 6 months in order to ‘reduce 
tensions in the foreign exchange market’16. 
The President signed the bill into law on Novem-
ber 15. It is possible that the NBU deliberately 
15 For instance, on 7 November, the European Commis-
sion published an ‘autumn’ macroeconomic forecast 
for 2012–2014, in which it lowered the expected GDP 
growth across the 27 EU member states to 0.4% (from 
1.3% projected in its ‘Spring’ forecast); the projected 
growth for the eurozone has been lowered to just 0.1% 
(http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-12-1178_en.htm).
16 Compulsory sale of foreign currency earnings was 
scrapped in 2005.
A recovery of Ukraine’s economy is ex-
pected to begin in 2013. Such recovery, 
however, is dependent on the highly un-
predictable economic situation in other 
markets. It is therefore hard to say whether 
the current recession will be short-lived.
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abandoned its attempts to protect the hryvnia 
after the elections, and by allowing the curren-
cy to depreciate the NBU was able to influence 
the government’s decision on the new bill17.
Allowing for controlled depreciation of the 
hryvnia, the government has demonstrated to 
the IMF that it is willing to partially free up the 
exchange rate by following one of the measures 
recommended by the IMF to protect the econ-
omy against external shocks. This also offers 
indirect evidence of Kiev’s desire to resume its 
cooperation with the IMF.
In order to improve public finances in the com-
ing months, it is likely that the government will 
intensify the pressure on local businesses, in 
line with its tried and tested fiscal mechanisms 
(corporate income tax prepayments, delays in 
the return of overpaid VAT, etc.).
The government will try to come out of the re-
cession paying the lowest social and political 
cost possible. The on-going economic slow-
down has already undermined one of the pillars 
17 In order to reduce the risk of currency speculation, the 
NBU is considering the introduction of a 15% tax on for-
eign currency sales.
on which the Party of Regions and President 
Yanukovych attempted to construct their public 
image – the myth of a ‘team of professionals’ 
who returned to power in 2010 to ‘tidy up’ the 
incompetent rule of the ‘orange’ government. 
This myth seemed to work in times of economic 
prosperity and healthy export markets, which 
until now tended to coincide with the periods 
when the current party was in power18. This 
time it appears that the Party of Regions will 
not be able to cope with the economic prob-
lems without outside help, especially with Kiev’s 
limited capacity to service its foreign debt. 
A marked improvement in Ukraine’s relations 
with the IMF will therefore be key to the coun-
try’s future. It can be expected that the govern-
ment in Kiev will have little choice but to raise 
the price of utilities and gas. More serious and 
socially unpopular economic reforms, however, 
are unlikely, particularly in the context of the 
2015 presidential election whose campaign is 
expected to start next year.
At present, Russia offers the only alternative 
to the unpopular reforms and Ukraine’s reli-
ance on the West. The price of Russia’s support, 
however, may be high. Moscow has repeatedly 
stipulated its conditions, which effectively boil 
down to the inclusion of Ukraine in the re-in-
tegration processes already being implemented 
across other parts of the former Soviet Union. 
This, however, could frustrate Ukraine’s recent 
achievements, which until now have allowed 
Kiev to talk about ensuring a balance in its rela-
tions with Russia and the West.
18 Also between 2002–2004 and 2006–2007, when Viktor 
Yanukovych was in charge of the Ukrainian government.
No far-reaching reforms should be ex-
pected before the 2015 presidential elec-
tion. Closer links with Russia appear to be 
the only available alternative to unpopular 
reforms and Kiev’s reliance on the West. 
A shift towards Russia would however mean 
Ukraine’s inclusion in the re-integration 
processes across the former Soviet Union.
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APPENDIX
1. Ukraine’s GDP dynamics between 2000–2012
Source: Ukraine’s Office for National Statistics
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2. Ukraine’s basic macroeconomic indicators
Jan–Sept 2012 compared to Jan–Sept 2011
Gross Domestic Product below 1.5%*
Industrial Production -1.2%
Agricultural Production -4.4%
Construction Industry -9.1%
Inflation 0.8%
Export of goods 
(in billions USD)
1.8%
(50.8)
Import of goods 
(in billion USD)
4.7%
(62.3)
Foreign Trade Balance
(in billion USD) / [Jan–Sept 2011] (-11,5) / [-9,5]
* NBU estimates
Source: Ukraine’s Office for National Statistics
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3. Industrial production and global metal prices 
Source: Ukraine’s Office for National Statistics, IMF (based on: Forbes-Ukraine)
4. Ukraine’s foreign debt service obligations to its major lenders (2011–2013)
Source: NBU (based on: Forbes-Ukraine)
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